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To what extent do unexpected, apolitical events affect governors’ popularity?
Individuals’ attitudes towards government are often random, and executives at both the
state-level and national-level are held accountable for events that they have little control
over. In this study, I seek to understand how these unplanned events affect support for
elected officials. Specifically, I examine the effect of the declaration of a State of
Emergency on gubernatorial approval. I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) model and
data from FEMA as well as the United States Officials Job Approval Ratings dataset to
answer such questions. The results indicate that not only do natural and manmade
disasters NOT have a negative effect on governors’ popularity, there is actually no
correlation between the two variables at all. Instead, I find that relative to one another,
major disaster declarations have a stronger negative effect on a governor’s approval
ratings than emergency declarations. Though surprising, I suggest that these disasters
simply do not affect enough individuals for a long enough time to have an impact on
gubernatorial popularity.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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1.1 Introduction

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the coast of
southeastern Louisiana. What was originally supposed to be a tropical depression
strengthened into a Category 5 hurricane with winds of up to 140 miles per hour
spanning hundreds of miles. Storm surges flooded coastal cities up to 30 feet
above sea level resulting in the devastation of beaches, homes, and infrastructure.
An estimated $160 billion in damages were caused by Hurricane Katrina, and
years passed before these coastal cities recovered. It is considered one of the
worst natural disasters in U.S. history.

The aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina were felt socially, culturally,
economically, and politically. Politically, the criticism of the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina has been widely documented in new sources and academic
journals alike. President George W. Bush’s approval ratings crashed as his
appointed director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) failed
to adequately respond to the disaster. However, much less is known of
constituents’ impressions of the state and local-level responses. Governor
Kathleen Blanco had been serving for a mere year and a half prior to the disaster
and ultimately decided not to seek reelection after her short tenure. A Gallup poll
804 respondents in New Orleans revealed that 54% of residents approved of
Mayor Ray Nagin’s response to the tragedy and 50% approved of the local police
force, while only 33% approved of Governor Blanco’s handling of the event. In
comparison, 23% of residents approved of President Bush’s relief efforts, and a
mere 22% approved of the measures of FEMA. Despite being in relatively good
standing prior to the disaster declaration, Governor Blanco carried a significant
burden in her preparedness and response to the storm.
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Not only did the citizens of Louisiana form opinions on her preparedness
and response to the storm, but she also became a subject of criticism nationwide.
This visceral reaction to elected officials of all levels begged the question of
when, how, and why constituents hold their leaders accountable. How did Mayor
Nagin escape Hurricane Katrina relatively unscathed while Governor Blanco,
President Bush, and FEMA took the bulk of the blame? Incumbent politicians are
rewarded and punished in any democracy, but why were state and federal figures
held more accountable than local authorities?

Elected officials have long since been blamed for events out of their
control. Pharaohs were held responsible for the flooding of the Nile River, and
rulers of the Middle Ages were blamed for the spread of the plague (King and
Cohen 2005). More recently, even elected officials in the United States have seen
a decrease in support following a series of catastrophic shark attacks (Achen and
Bartels 2013). Though our elected officials are clearly not responsible for these
unforeseen events, these examples of retrospective evaluation may have a
significant effect on their decision-making. In an effort to avoid a dip in approval
ratings, elected officials may begin acting proactively rather than reactively in
anticipation of looming natural disasters or suspected terrorist attacks. In this
paper, I seek to address the relationship between these unplanned events and
individuals’ attitudes towards government. Specifically, I examine state-level
politics to test whether individuals evaluate their governor retrospectively
following States of Emergency.
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State governments have seen an increase in autonomy in past decades
given the rise of “states’ rights” issues, such as welfare reform, marijuana
legalization, and marriage equality (King and Cohen 2005). Such issues have
given rise to the importance of the governorship. Much like the presidency,
governors have seen an expansion of executive power, both formal and informal.
Formally, governors have exercised more power with line-item vetoes,
appointments, and budgetary control. Informally, governors have taken to agenda
setting and have gained national-level attention as a result of policy diffusion
(King and Cohen 2005). Among the most important determinants of gubernatorial
power is also the most inconstant: popularity.

An understanding of individuals’ evaluations of their governors may yield
important insights into the decision-making of these state-level executives. In an
attempt to understand this relationship, I will first review the most relevant
research in both the presidential and gubernatorial bodies of literature. I will then
apply a theory of blind retrospection to the governorship. Using data from the
United States Officials Job Approval Ratings dataset, I will test my hypothesis
with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. My results indicate that while
natural and manmade disasters themselves do not have a significant impact on
gubernatorial popularity, relative to one another, major disaster declarations have
a greater negative effect on approval ratings than emergency declarations. Such
findings shed light on the importance of precautionary measures and proper
responses to catastrophes as elective officials will be held responsible as the
damages increase.
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1.2 Literature Review

In the U.S., a simple Google search yields decades of presidential and
congressional approval ratings but rarely are their importance discussed. What are
approval ratings? Why do they matter? Project FiveThirtyEight may tell its
readers that President Trump is sitting at a 53.5% approval rating, but we don’t
see any further discussion of the substantive effects of this number. Does a
sustained 50% approval rating result in a president persuading Congress to pass
more legislation? What are the mechanisms by which a president can translate his
or her approval ratings into informal power? The reporting of a simple percentage
does not tell the full story. Believe it or not, even the most powerful of dignitaries
care about the affections of their populace. A totalitarian must be especially aware
of his or her dissenters, knowing exactly how many resources to devote to
suppression. In a democracy, powerful are those who can continue to win
reelection and continue to shape the political landscape. In the case of executives,
both presidents and governors have an acute advantage in their party and over
their legislatures should their approval ratings be high. The power of elected
officials is directly derived from their constituencies.

It would appear as though the easiest way to gauge executive popularity is
via elections or retrospective evaluation. If we like our governor or president, we
vote him or her into office; if we dislike our governor or president, we vote him or
her out of office. A typical understanding of retrospective voting is that each
election is a referendum, and voters use policy outcomes as a measure of whether
or not they like or dislike an elected official. Citizens will continue to vote for
representatives who sign bills that provide funding to their roads, parks, and
schools, regardless of the policy instruments used to secure such funding.
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Retrospective voting differs from the concept of prospective voting, in
which constituents vote for candidates based on their promises for the future.
Though simplistic, this model of retrospective evaluation (Fiorina 1981) offers
only a snapshot into the approval ratings of an elected official. The results of a
single election cannot be a fair comparison to the ebb and flow in approval ratings
throughout the entirety of president's or governor’s term. Election results account
for competition between candidates but do not capture the nuances of voters’
expectations of an executive and his or her job performance.

Furthermore, election results can be seemingly random. Achen and Bartels
(2012) discuss a theory of “blind retrospection”, in which voters reward or punish
their incumbent candidates as a result of unrelated, apolitical events. In 1916,
President Woodrow Wilson lost a significant number of votes from a New Jersey
community following an unfortunate cluster of shark attacks on their beach
(Achen and Bartels 2012). Citizens demanded help from the federal government,
but no agencies existed at the time to offer any assistance. Following the tragedy,
President Wilson lost nearly all of the votes in New Jersey. Four months had
passed since the attacks, but towns on the New Jersey shoreline were still feeling
the effects of decreased tourism to their beaches. Achen and Bartels argue that
voters are not always punishing incumbent candidates for their inadequate
responses to these events. In this case, there were no mechanisms in place for the
federal government to assist in such a localized disaster, and citizens could not
have possibly expected for President Wilson to correct the issue. Blind
retrospective differs from our typical understanding of retrospective evaluation in
that citizens are not making direct connections between their own welfare and the
actions of their incumbents. It is quite literally leaving electoral outcomes up to
chance.
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If elections results tell an incomplete story of executive popularity, we
must consider more precise and continual measures of popularity. Pollsters have
long sought to quantify the attitudes and beliefs of individuals via public opinion.
As early as the 1930s, polling organizations have gauged Americans’ responses to
major political and economic events as well as their well-being on a weekly and
monthly basis. Most notably, since 2008, Gallup has been administering daily
questionnaires asking 500 respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the
job the current president is doing. Approval ratings have ranged anywhere from
President Truman’s low of 22% during the Korean War in 1952 to President Bush’s
high of 90% following the September 11 attacks in 2001. The frequency and
accuracy of such polls has increased with the use of weighted samples and randomdigit-dialing, securing Gallup’s position as the standard measurement of
presidential approval ratings.

Polling data may give us a quick, easily-digestible numerical
representation of presidential approval, but it does not tell us why individuals
evaluate presidents the way they do. This begs the question: How do we
determine the popularity of our state and national-level executives? Mueller
(1970) identifies four main predictors of presidential popularity: time in office,
“rally around the flag” effects, economic recession, and war. The approval rating
of any given president is inevitably a function of time, and though time yields
experience, the number of days a president has served does not work in his or her
favor. The longer he or she is in office, the lower his or her approval ratings will
be. Even the most favorable of presidents, including President Reagan, can begin
their terms with approval ratings of 60% or more and finish their terms with
approval ratings lower than 50%. A second determinant of whether or not we like
our president is economic prosperity. Presidents who are fortunate to serve in
economic booms, such as President Clinton, have undoubtedly fared well in the
public light while Presidents Hoover and Carter are still remembered for the
economic busts they presided over.
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Lengthy terms and economic recession may, however, be mitigated by
external threat. Known as the “rally around the flag” effect, a president may
experience a bump in approval ratings following a conflict with another state.
Citizens are subject to an “us” vs. “them” mentality and rally in support of the
president as he or she works to de-escalate the conflict. Such an effect gives the
president unchecked power as members of Congress are weary to speak out
against a president during times of conflict. Most notable, President G.W. Bush
experienced approval ratings as high as 90% following the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. Such popularity allowed him unparalleled success in pushing
legislation through Congress. Though powerful, the “rally around the flag” effect
is likely short-lived if the U.S. is to become embroiled in a long, costly war.
Presidents quickly fall out of favor when it is perceived that the U.S. is “losing” a
conflict and fatalities and expenses are not justified. Despite initial support for the
Vietnam War, President Johnson faced approval ratings as low as 35% as the
costs of war became clear. Each president has experienced both wins and losses as
a result of his approval rating. Though these institutional parameters offer a
streamlined, predictive model of presidential popularity, there may be other
individual-level factors influencing how we evaluate our executives.

Thus far, I have referred to governors and presidents interchangeably as
“executives”. In many ways, the governorship mimics the presidency. Though
lengthier, state constitutions have modeled their executive branch to create a
singular actor not unlike the president. Governors and presidents control their
respective bureaucracies and negotiate with their respective legislatures. Most
importantly, both governors and presidents are the most visible actors in their
arena, allowing for the most variance of approval ratings.
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Distinct from the president, governors garner their popularity through
more localized policy initiatives. They are able to do so through informal and
formal powers (Beyle 1999). Among these informal powers is popularity with the
public. Intuitively, more popular governors have more political capital to have
their agendas passed. King and Cohen (2005) note that despite the importance of
this political capital, little research has been done to explore what factors motivate
a governors’ popularity. Existing studies accounted only for economic factors
(Adams and Squire 2001) or national climate (Crew and Weiher 1996) with little
consideration for unexpected events such as disaster declarations. Much like
presidents, governors fare better in periods of economic prosperity. Governors
also benefit if a president of their party is becoming more popular. Models of
presidential approval have also been applied to the state-level executives without
consideration of the nuances between the two offices.

There are a number of distinctions between the two executives that
prevent models of presidential approval from being applied to the governorship.
Unlike models of presidential approval, King and Cohen (2005) suggest that
models of gubernatorial approval must account for both state-level and nationallevel factors. Much to the dismay of the Framers and the 10th Amendment, state
politics are often reactionary to national politics (King and Cohen 2005).
Statewide elections occurring during midterm years can serve as a referenda
against the national government. As such, presidential approval ratings, as well as
shared state partisanship, can be predictors of gubernatorial popularity. Other
state-level factors similar to those in models of presidential approval ratings
include unemployment and divided government.
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The passage of time, economic fluxes, and foreign affairs can be
anticipated in any given presidency or governorship, but how do we evaluate our
elected officials when things don't go according to plan? In the case of presidents,
non-domestic events with foreign actors, such as war or acts of terrorism, result in
a “rally around the flag” effect (Mueller 1973). However, it is unlikely that a
governor is held directly responsible for such international-level events.

Instead, governors may be held responsible for state-level emergencies
including natural and manmade disasters. Storms such as tornadoes, hurricanes,
and earthquakes; chemical and biological leaks; radiation; contaminated water;
and even viruses are generally most impactful at the state-level. In such
emergencies, individuals may use more individual-level factors rather than
institutional factors in evaluating their executive. Individuals’ evaluations of their
elected officials are a product of their own well-being. If one’s situation changes
for the worst following a disaster, he or she may hold his or her representatives,
senators, governor, and president responsible. Existing models of gubernatorial
approval ratings mimic those of the presidency, including national-level
institutional factors, but do not account for localized, state-level emergencies that
may change individuals’ expectations and evaluations of their governors.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) itself defines the
disaster declaration process in the plainest terms: “all emergency and major
disaster declarations are made solely at the discretion of the President of the
United States”, and “all requests for a declaration by the President that a major
disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State.” Each state
must conduct a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) through its FEMA
Regional Office to determine the scale of the disaster and what type of assistance
is warranted. Such assistance must be beyond the capabilities of the state.
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FEMA notes two types of disaster declarations: emergency declarations
and major disaster declarations. Both must be requested by the governor of the
state in need. The president will often provide assistance in both types of
declarations, but each will differ in the type of assistance offered.

Whether natural or manmade, a catastrophe can result in an emergency
declaration if the funding will not exceed $5 million dollars, which includes
Public Assistance (PA) and Individual Assistance (IA). PA covers damage to
publicly-owned facilities, while IA services households not covered by insurance.
Emergency declarations do not receive funding for any preventative measures for
future catastrophes. Major disaster declarations are reserved for natural events
such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, snowstorms, fires, floods,
droughts, and volcanic eruptions. Both responsive and preventative assistance are
available for major disaster declarations. Much like emergency declarations, PA
and IA are available for immediate recovery. The president can also provide
Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) programs to prevent further loss and injury
in future natural disasters.

Though these manmade and natural disasters occur at random, the rate at
which a president signs an emergency declaration or major disaster declaration is
dependent on a number of predictable factors. Garrett and Sobel (2003) find that
states that are politically important to the president have higher rates of disaster
declaration. Not only are more disasters declared, but more funding is allocated as
well in the form of PA, IA, and HMA. Such increases are especially visible
during election years, suggesting that this assistance is politically motivated rather
than altruistic. Reeves (2011) echoes this concern, suggesting that governors are
“opportunists”. Because presidents are able to unilaterally allocate funding to
specific constituencies, they do so to bolster their electoral gains, and voters in
competitive states reward presidents for their disaster declarations.

11

Gasper and Reeves (2012) expand this study to include the political
motivations of governors as well. They see each federally funded dollar as a
potential vote for state and local-level officials. They also hypothesize whether
governors are less likely to request assistance if the disaster declaration may
benefit a president of the opposite party. Thankfully, while governors up for
reelection may behave opportunistically, there is no evidence to support partisan
motivations. Even those from competitive states request disaster declarations from
presidents of opposing parties. Not surprisingly, Cutter and Emrich (2005)
confirm that not only are the geographic patterns of disaster declarations
inconsistent with actual weather patterns, but that estimated damages from these
catastrophes are increasing each year. It is no secret to federal, state, and local
elected officials that funding for catastrophes can equal major political capital.

While robust, the two bodies of literature on both gubernatorial approval
ratings and disaster declarations have yet to be synthesized. Existing models of
executive popularity do not account for unexpected catastrophes such as
hurricanes or acts of terrorism, nor do studies of disaster declarations discuss the
long-term effects on the political arena. We do not currently have an
understanding of how constituents view their state and local-level officials
following a grisly, unplanned event, and how a possible change in popularity may
affect their informal powers to enact legislation and chances at reelection.

1.3 Theory and Hypothesis

Thus far, our knowledge of gubernatorial popularity is deeply rooted in the
literature on presidential approval ratings. Political scientists have conceived of
governors’ popularity not only as a function of individual-level characteristics but
also national-level characteristics as well. Though robust, existing models have
accounted for political and economic activity with little regard to more
unexpected events that take place outside of the political area and economy. Such
events, including natural disasters and acts of mass violence and terrorism, have
12

occurred frequently enough to demand attention from scholars. The most notable
and recognizable of natural disasters, Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, exhibited just
how powerful of an effect these events may have on the elected officials who
handle them.
Though there is no exact parallel to mirror a catastrophe in existing
models, a “rally around the flag” effect such as a skirmish or war may be most
similar to the occurrence of a disaster given its unexpectedness. In cases of
conflict, presidents have historically enjoyed a bump in approval ratings, most
likely due to the togetherness felt when rallying around a common enemy. In a
natural disaster, there is no “other” to fight against. There also is no valor or
victory involved a natural disaster to boost approval ratings. Even the best
outcomes, such as a rebuilt community or the creation of new jobs, may not come
about until long after a governor’s tenure.
Not only is there no enemy to act as a scapegoat, constituents in the wake
of a storm or fire will likely experience negative, sustained effects from its
damage, and regardless of their culpability, elected officials will be to blame. It is
known that individuals vote based on their personal wellbeing. Following a
disaster, constituents are not only subject to physical damage to their homes,
schools, businesses, and parks, but also economic hardship and mental duress. As
an individual’s wellbeing decreases, their discontent for their politicians will
increase. As seen in the case of Hurricane Katrina, voters may still be rebuilding
their lives weeks, months, and even years after the catastrophe. Even if it is not an
election year, the response to a disaster may continue to haunt elected officials
until the end of their term. Even if a perfect response to a tragedy is executed,
constituents will likely still punish their elected officials for the subsequent
hardships.
The most visible, singular actors are also more susceptible to punishment
by the electorate. At the state-level, governors are the most easily identifiable
politicians, while state legislatures and courts may fly under the radar; therefore, I
anticipate that governors will be held most responsible following a catastrophic
13

event. While voters may not even be able to name their state-level senator or
representative, they are more likely to know their governor’s name and fame.
Constituents will punish their elected officials despite the unexpected, improbable
occurrence of a disaster, and their governor will be held accountable for any
subsequent shortcomings in their quality of life.
In addition to their name-recognition, governors are also a key player in
the response effort following a catastrophe. The president cannot act until the
governor has specifically requested support from the federal government. Despite
the resources available from the federal government, governors must act first
before receiving aid from FEMA. The hours after natural disasters have hit are
crucial as a governor must discern whether or not to act. The duration from the
beginning of a storm, attack, etc. to the moment a state of emergency is highly
dependent on a governor’s course of action. A state of emergency may even be
declared at the state-level by a governor and not declared as a disaster at the
national-level by the president if the governor does not make a compelling case
for assistance. Because of this chain of command, governors are left highly
culpable for the funding or lack thereof following the occurrence of a disaster.
Given their visibility, I expect to see a dip in approval ratings for
governors following such catastrophes. Hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes,
chemical spills, and mass violence all result in a decrease in the quality of life for
constituents. Thus, they will turn to the most singular actor in the political system
to alleviate the problem. Presidents and other federal-level officials cannot begin
to act in an emergency until a governor has performed his or her duties. Even if
the perfect response to a disaster declaration is executive, a governor’s popularity
will still suffer as the infrastructural and economic effects will likely persist for
weeks, months, or even years following an emergency.

H1: Governors’ approval ratings will decrease following the occurrence of
a disaster declaration

14

CHAPTER 2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
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2.1 Dependent Variable: Gubernatorial Popularity (JAR Data)

Approval ratings for national-level executives and institutions have been
readily available for decades. Political scientists and laymen alike have been
tracking the popularity of the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court daily
for a number of years. The country watched as President Nixon’s approval ratings
fell to 24% following the Watergate scandal, and Republicans and Democrats
alike mobilized as President George W. Bush’s approving ratings skyrocketed to
90% following the September 11th tragedy. Such popularity, or lack thereof, is
important as it has become the standard by which we judge our elected officials.

State politics scholars, however, have not been so fortunate. How did the
state of Louisiana respond to Governor Blanco’s efforts following Hurricane
Katrina? Prior to the compilation of the U.S. Job Approval Ratings (JAR) dataset
in 1999, approval ratings for governors and state legislatures were almost nonexistent (Beyle et al. 2002). While states did collect this data, it was rarely
available to the public and was not organized in any meaningful way. Each state
collected its data differently, with varying questions, scales, and time frames. The
JAR dataset mitigated these differences with a single, compiled dataset using
percent positions as a mean of standardizing the various approval ratings.

A growing interest in state-politics research has demanded an aggregation
of such approval ratings. Though it has yet to be updated, it remains the only
compilation of state-level approval ratings available to the public. The JAR
dataset combines state-level approval ratings for all 50 states using data gathered
from commercial, media, and university survey organizations from 1947 to 2000.
These are aggregate data rather than an expansive list of the original individuallevel survey responses from each state.
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Though innovative, the JAR dataset is not without its faults, and the
collectors of these data have mitigated these variances using aggregation.
Measurements of gubernatorial popularity are not consistent across states. Some
questionnaires may use language such as “approve or disapprove” while others
may allow participants to rank their responses as “excellent”, “good/fair”, or
“poor”. Their frequency and intervals may also vary by weeks or even months,
and such variances have not been captured in a single variable. Among the states
with the most over-reported data include California and Minnesota, while those
with the most underreported data include Massachusetts and Indiana. States such
as Montana had a small number of ratings that were regular and consistent, and
states such as New Hampshire had many ratings that were only available for
single years.

States with 20 or more observations include Alabama, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Florida, and Minnesota. States with fewer than
10 observations include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine,
Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington. Such observations steadily increased after 1982 as
polling activity began to pick up. The lowest reported approval rating for a
governor was 16%, while the highest reported gubernatorial approval rating
soared at 90%. The average popularity of governors sits at 56%. Though flawed,
the use of this dataset still remains more accurate than other heuristics such as
reelection and policy victories.

This data would be meaningless without the inclusion of surveying dates;
however, in this study, I have further aggregated the data to include only a single
year for each state. To do so, I used an average of each year’s gubernatorial
approval ratings. This allows for the regression of events in a single year on
gubernatorial approval.
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The dependent variable, gubernatorial approval, is a continuous variable
representing the percentage of popularity of a given governor. In this dataset, the
percentages of gubernatorial approval range from a low of 16% to a high of
90.27%. The mean percentage of governors’ popularity is 56.63% with a standard
deviation of 15.03.

Table 1 displays the five lowest reported gubernatorial approval ratings in
the JAR dataset, and Table 2 references the five highest instances of governors’
popularity in the data. Among the first female governors elected, Barbara Roberts
served in Oregon for only 4 years from 1991-1995. In that time, Governor
Roberts faced a budget crisis following the passage of a bill that limited income
taxes, which subsequently led to cuts in spending for social welfare programs that
had been promised during campaign season. Not surprisingly, she chose not to see
reelection given her low approval ratings. Mike Leavitt served as governor of
Utah for 10 years from 1993 to 2003 and was cited twice among the highest
approval ratings. During his tenure, Governor Leavitt enacted healthcare, welfare,
educational, and environmental reform. He was eventually reelected for a third
term and resigned only to serve of President George W. Bush’s cabinet.

Table 1.1: Lowest Gubernatorial Approval Ratings (1978-2000)
Governor
Barbara Roberts
William Donald Schaefer
Toney Anaya
Edwin Edwards
Gaston Caperton

State
Oregon
Maryland
New Mexico
Louisiana
West Virginia

Year
1993
1993
1986
1987
1989

Popularity
16%
16.16%
17.83%
21.28%
21.46%

Table 1.2: Highest Gubernatorial Approval Ratings (1978-2000)
Governor
State
Year
Popularity
Roy Barnes
Georgia
1999
90.27%
Zell Miller
Georgia
1998
88.47%
Mike Leavitt
Utah
1993
88.3%
Tom Carper
Delaware
2000
88%
Mike Leavitt
Utah
1994
87.37%
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2.2 Independent Variable: States of Emergency (FEMA Data)

Fortunately, much to the opposite of gubernatorial popularity, data on
natural and manmade disasters has been readily available for decades. Since 1953,
the federal government has collected data on state and national disaster
declarations. Such data includes the duration of the incident, date of disaster
declaration, geographic information, and any financial assistance awarded. It is
currently available on FEMA’s website without a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request.

The most important independent variable, the presence of a natural or
manmade disaster, is a function of FEMA. FEMA recognizes natural and
manmade disasters as those declared by the president. Disaster declarations are
organized according to state/tribal government, disaster type, and declaration
type. The process of declaring a state of emergency is a somewhat cumbersome
event. State and local governments must first declare a state of emergency and
then plead to their local FEMA chapter for additional resources. If approved, a
governor will then declare a formal state of emergency in the state, which will
then be overseen by the national government. Disasters that have had such an
impact to be declared an emergency by the national FEMA office include those
such as Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Harvey, and Hurricane Katrina.

In this study, I utilize four separate dichotomous variables as measures of
disaster declarations. Each of these four measures is included in the model as a
separate dummy variable with a value of “1” if the disaster declaration occurred
and “0” if a disaster declaration did not occur.
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Of the 360 reported occurrences of disaster declarations 1978-2000, 25
were emergency declarations, which are less severe and include any natural or
manmade disaster with damages not exceeding $5 million dollars. 39 of the
occurrences were fire management assistance declarations, which include only
forest or grassland fires. 296 of the occurrences were major disaster declarations,
which are most severe and include only natural disasters with no specific limit on
monetary damages. Incidents included severe storms, flooding, tornadoes, winter
storms, sewer explosions, toxic waste, high winds, fire, hurricanes, extreme soil
saturation, earthquakes, landslides, virus threats, terrorism, etc. Each of these was
noted different depending on the particular states’ verbiage. For example, some
states report “blizzards” while others report “heavy snowfall” or “snow
accumulation”. There were also 263 instances where a state of emergency was not
declared.

Though this study uses a simple measure for the occurrence of a natural or
manmade disaster, with appropriate time, other studies may use insurance claims
or total damages as a measure of the severity of a disaster. For the purposes of this
study, I will not discern between natural and manmade disasters. Both events have
similar, sustained negative effects on the populace that can affect the popularity of
elected officials
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2.3 Control Variables
The control variables in this study are numerous and varied. Studies of
state-level approval have often only focused on one characteristic: economic
performance. We now know that national-level factors can also have an effect on
state-level politics. For example, the performance of the sitting president will
have residual effects on the popularity of governors and state legislatures. While
the Framers may have intended for entirely separate federal and state
governments, in reality, the two are very much intertwined. It is important that
models of state-level popularity include measures of presidential popularity as
well as national economic performance. My model includes national-level, statelevel, and individual-level factors in considering the variance of gubernatorial
approval ratings.

Despite being autonomous, individual states are not insulated from
national happenings. Specifically, indicators of economic performance for the
nation as a whole can very much affect a given state. The national-level factor
that affects a governor’s popularity is inflation. In this model, national-level
inflation is the percentage change in the consumer price index, which ranges from
63.5% to 173% with a standard deviation of 23.66. I also include another
economic indicator: state-level unemployment. State-level unemployment is
measured as the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics within the U.S. Department of Labor. From 1978-2000,
the highest reported state unemployment rate was in the state of Alabama with
14.15% of its labor force looking for work in 1982. In 2000, Connecticut
presented the lowest reported state unemployment with only 2.15% of its
workforce without wages. Both state-level and national-level unemployment were
highly correlated, thus this model accounts only for unemployment within states.
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Reminiscent of models of presidential popularity, there are also a number
of state-level factors that can affect a governor’s approval ratings. In this study, I
include measures for unified/divided government in state legislatures, state
ideology, population size, and diversity.

Unified government is presented as a simple dichotomous variable with
“1” denoting that the governor is of the same party as the majority in the state
legislator. This differs from the variable of state ideology, which is the net state
partisanship score derived from the Erikson-Wright-McIver data on state
partisanship and ideology (Erikson et al. 1993). King and Cohen (2005) calculate
this value by subtracting the percentage of survey respondents who identify with
the opposition party from the percentage of survey respondents who identify with
the governor’s party. The variable for state ideology is the percentage of liberal
voters minus the percentage of conservative voters, which ranges from -25.9% to
29.5% with a standard deviation of 15.95.

Population size is a simple measure of the number of millions of citizens
within the state. State populations range from Wyoming with fewer than 1 million
people to California with over 30 million people. The diversity of such
populations is measured by the Sullivan index, which includes proportions of
race, gender, and profession (Morgan and Wilson 1990). The state with the
highest population diversity is New York with nearly 58% while Arkansas is the
state with the lowest population diversity with only 40%.

In addition to the factors out of his or her control, the individual-level
characteristics of a particular governor can also have an effect on popularity. This
study accounts for each governors’ party identification, length into his or her
term, and the total percentage of votes won in the most recent general election. A
governor’s party identification is measured simply with a dichotomous variable in
which Democratic governors are coded as “1” and Republican governors are
coded as “0”.
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The length of time that a governor has served is measured in months.
Governor Bill Clinton had only been serving in Arkansas for 4 months prior to the
occurrence of a disaster declaration while Governor Booth Gardner had already
been serving for over 10 years when the last disaster declaration in his term took
place. The percentage of the general election won by each governor is also a
simple measure ranging from only 33% of the vote won by Governor Buddy
Roemer in Louisiana to 82% of the votes won by Governor William Schaefer in
Maryland.

I also include fixed effects for both state and year. This dataset includes
observations from all 50 states ranging from 1978-2000.

2.4 Methodology and Results

Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, gubernatorial
popularity, this study utilizes a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model.
Though simple, such a model has become the standard within the literature. The
model, which includes national-level, state-level, and individual-level factors,
yielded some surprising results.

Table 3 contains the results of four models. Note, the same model is
presented four times, but each model rotates the excluded category from the main
variables of interest, which is the type of disaster declaration. This allows us to
compare the influence of, say, fire assistance declarations to emergency
declarations (e.g., Model 1) or any type of declaration to no declaration (e.g.,
Model 4).

23

The model accounts for 52% of the variance of governors’ popularity in
all 50 states from 1978-2000. The variance in the approval rating of a governor
can best be explained by individual, state, and national level factors. Not
surprisingly, the percentage of votes won in the general election is among the best
predictors of a governor’s popularity. The higher the vote share, the more wellliked a governor will be throughout his or her tenure. Similarly, governors’
approval ratings also declined the longer he or she was in office. Democratic
governors fared much worse than their Republican counterparts. At the statelevel, the unemployment rate had a significant negative effect on gubernatorial
approval ratings. Oppositely, the national inflation rate had a significant positive
effect on gubernatorial approval ratings. Other state-level factors including the
presence of unified government, state ideology, population size, and population
diversity had no significant effects on a governor’s population.

Most notable, however, are the results between the three types of disaster
declarations: emergency declarations, fire management assistance declarations,
and major disaster declarations. Surprisingly, the three types of disaster
declarations have no significant effects on gubernatorial approving ratings when
compared to the nonoccurrence of a catastrophe (Model 4). However, when
compared to an emergency declaration, major disaster declarations have a
significant negative effect on a governor’s popularity. Oppositely, emergency
declarations have a significant positive effect on a governor’s popularity when
compared to major disaster declarations. Neither type of disaster declaration is
significant on its own, but relative to one another, major disaster declarations
make a governor less popular while emergency declarations make a governor less
popular. Such findings are not surprising given the total dollar amount of damages
for major disaster declarations will far exceed those of emergency declarations.
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Gubernatorial Popularity
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Emergency Declaration
Excluded
4.822
(3.208)

Model 3
4.028^
(2.377)

Model 4
3.146
(2.461)

Fire Assistance Declaration

-4.822
(3.208)

Excluded

-0.794
(2.323)

-1.676
(2.311)

Major Disaster Declaration

-4.028^
(2.377)

0.794
(2.323)

Excluded

-0.882
(1.081)

No Declaration

-3.146
(2.461)

1.676
(2.311)

0.882
(1.081)

Excluded

Democratic Governor

-4.889^
(2.706)

-4.889^
(2.706)

-4.889^
(2.706)

-4.889^
(2.706)

Unified Government

-0.962
(1.235)

-0.962
(1.235)

-0.962
(1.235)

-0.962
(1.235)

State Ideology

-0.050
(0.079)

-0.050
(0.079)

-0.050
(0.079)

-0.050
(0.079)

% Won of General Election

0.260***
(0.073)

0.260***
(0.073)

0.260***
(0.073)

0.260***
(0.073)

State Unemployment (Lagged)

-2.573***
(0.553)

-2.573***
(0.553)

-2.573***
(0.553)

2.573***
(0.553)

Inflation

1.549*
(0.630)

1.549*
(0.630)

1.549*
(0.630)

Population Diversity

78.982
(93.777)

78.982
(93.777)

78.982
(93.777)

Population Size

0.292
(0.861)

0.292
(0.861)

0.292
(0.861)

0.292
(0.861)

Length of Term (Months)

-0.088^
(0.045)

-0.088^
(0.045)

-0.088^
(0.045)

0.088^
(0.045)

N
R-sq

623
0.520

Standard errors in parentheses
^ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (two-tailed)
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1.549*
(0.630)
78.982
(93.777)

CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSION
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3.1 Scholarly and Practical Implications

The null results of this study beg the question, “Why don’t natural and
manmade disasters have any effect on our governors’ popularity?” Given that
governors are the most visible actors in the state and such disasters affect the
wellbeing of citizens, we should expect to see a dip in approval ratings following
the declaration of a state of emergency.

Perhaps the disasters themselves also do not affect individuals intensely
enough for a long enough time to yield any difference in governors’ popularity.
We may expect to see a change in approval rating for disasters that earn national
coverage, including rare events such as Hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 disaster,
but events reoccurring year-to-year including snowstorms, floods, and forest fires
tend to make up the majority of observations in this dataset. These issues may not
be salient enough to result in electoral outcomes.

The null results may also be a result of incomplete data. There may not be
enough gubernatorial approval data for years in which natural disasters occurs,
and there is no variable to account for the time passed after a state of emergency
before the surveys were taken. Similarly, it may be that any decline in popularity
a governor may experience as a result of an emergency declaration may be very
short lived, and thus would be difficult to discern with only yearly data. Future
studies could also include more robust measures of these states of emergencies
including insurance claims and money in damages as well as more fine grained
monthly data, if possible. Rather than using a dichotomous measure of whether a
disaster occurred that year with lagged approval ratings, one could parse out these
ratings month-by-month if the data would allow.
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The availability of such data is important, and more scholars should
commit to the upkeep of such a dataset. There should also be a push for the
uniformity of polling data and questionnaires regarding the popularity of state and
local level officials. It not only yields insight into how states govern themselves
but also how national-level happenings may trickle down to state and local
governments

Despite the lack of significant findings, we must not forget why an
understanding of state-level popularity is important. The data does show that
certain catastrophes may affect a governor’s approval ratings more than others.
Compared to the quicker and less costly emergency declarations, major disaster
declarations are more likely to have a negative effect on gubernatorial approval
ratings.

Knowing this, state-level officials may begin to reevaluate their response
to these natural and manmade disasters. If a governor understands that his or her
popularity will plummet following a major disaster declaration, he or she may be
more likely to act quickly when evaluating demanding and requesting assistance
from the federal government. Governors and state legislators may also begin to
focus on the preventive measures offered by the federal government following a
major disaster declaration rather than relying only on immediate funding and
resources. Though their motives may not be altruistic, a better understanding of
gubernatorial popularity may lead to better decision-making by governors that
will have tangible outcomes for citizens in the event of a state of emergency.
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